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FADI is a complete programming environment that serves the reliable execution of distributed application
programs. FADI encompasses all aspects of modern fault-tolerant distributed computing. The built-in user-
transparent error detection mechanism covers processor node crashes and hardware transient failures. The
mechanism also integrates user-assisted error checks into the system failure model. The nucleus non-blocking
checkpointing mechanism combined with a novel selective message logging technique delivers an efficient,
low-overhead backup and recovery mechanism for distributed processes. FADI also provides means for
remote automatic process allocation on the distributed system nodes.
1. Introduction
It is generally accepted that distributed systems represent the backbone of today’s computing world. One
obvious benefit of distributed systems is their ability to efficiently solve complex problems that require vast
computational power. The execution of computation-hungry applications such as neural-network training or
various systems modelling can only be significantly speeded-up by exploiting parallelism. Another benefit of
distributed systems is that they reflect the global business and social environment in which we live and work.
The implementation of electronic commerce, flight reservation systems, satellite surveillance systems or real-
time telemetry systems is unthinkable without the services of intra and global distributed systems.
The deployment of distributed systems in these areas has put extra demand on their reliability. For distributed
processing of number-crunching applications it is important to implement fault-tolerant measures to avoid the
waste of computations accomplished on the whole distributed system when one of its nodes fails. In on-line
and mission-critical systems a fault in the system operation can disrupt control systems, hurt sales, or endan-
ger human lives. Distributed environments running such applications must be highly available, i.e they
should continue to provide stable and accurate services despite faults in the underlying hardware.
FADI was developed to harness the computational power of interconnected workstations to deliver reliable
distributed computing services in presence of hardware faults affecting individual nodes in a distributed sys-
tem. To achieve the stated objective, FADI has to support the automatic distribution of the application proc-
esses and provide means for user-transparent fault-tolerance in a multi-node environment.
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process recovery. Error detection is concerned with permanent and transient computer hardware faults as
well as faults in the application software and the communication links. The recovery of failed distributed
applications requires recovering the local execution state of the processes, as well as taking into considera-
tion the state of the communication channels between them at the time of failure.
The rest of this paper is organised as follows: section “2” gives an abstract view of FADI; section “3”
presents the error detection mechanism; sections “4 & 5” introduce a detailed description of the backup
and recovery mechanism; FADI performance evaluation is discussed in section “6” and concluding
remarks are made in section “7”.
2. Overview of the FADI System
2.1 Target Domain of Applications
FADI is designed to support computation-intensive applications executing on networked workstations.
While the “economy of effort” stipulates the introduction of measures that prevent the loss of the long-run-
ning computation results executing on distributed nodes, frequently it is difficult to justify the use of
expensive hardware replication fault-tolerance techniques. This frequently is the case for off-line computa-
tionally intensive applications such as simulations of mass and heat transfer [1], graphics rendering [2],
etc. Another relevant area for the application of FADI is on-line distributed programs such as decision sup-
port control mechanisms [3] and flight reservation systems. Such systems can tolerate a short delay in serv-
ices - for fault-management, but a complete halt of the system upon the occurrence of faults cannot be
accepted. This paper presents a cost-effective and efficient fault-tolerant solution for running these applica-
tions on network-based systems.
2.2 Structural Design of FADI
Figure 1 represents an abstract view of FADI operation. The Error Detection and Fault Recovery modules
run on a central node (usually the server) that is assumed to be fault-tolerant, i.e the probability of its
failure is negligible. The required reliability of the central node might be obtained by hardware
duplication, but the detail of achieving it is not relevant to the discussion of the FADI itself. To store the
3processes checkpoints, a centralised NFS file system that is visible and identical to all the network nodes is
also assumed.
Upon system start-up, FADI identifies the configuration of the underlying network and presents it to the
user, which selects the network node(s) on which the application processes should be executed. FADI
spawns the application processes on the specified nodes and periodically triggers their checkpointing to
save their execution image together with any inter-process messages are saved into stable storage.
Nodes participating in the application execution are continuously monitored, and in the event of node
crash, checkpoints of all the processes running on the failed node are extracted from stable storage and the
processes are restarted on an operative node. Interprocess messages received since the last checkpoint are
also replayed from the log. FADI also detects user-processes that have exited prematurely due to a
transient hardware failure and similarly recovers them.
Figure 1 FADI General Structural Design
3. Detection of Faults in the Hardware Environment
The starting point for all fault-tolerant strategies is the detection of an erroneous state that in the absence of
any corrective actions could lead to a failure of the system. FADI Error Detection Mechanism (EDM)
identifies two types of hardware faults: processor node crashes (as caused by power failure) and transient
hardware failures (temporary memory flips, bus errors, etc.) that cause the failure of a single application
process, and also allows the integration of user-programmed (application-specific) error checks.
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4It is assumed that the processing nodes are fail-silent, i.e they only send correct messages, or nothing at all.
However, the processes are not required to be to be fail-safe, i.e with a zero error latency.
3.1 Detecting node Failures
Detection of node failures is based on a central node monitoring task that periodically sends acknowledg-
ment requests to all the nodes in the system. Each node must acknowledge within a predefined time inter-
val (acknowledgment timeout), otherwise it will be considered as having “crashed”.
The difficulty associated with this detection technique is the calculation of the acknowledgment timeout.
Research in the Delta-4 system [4] asserted that the total message traffic between components of a dynam-
ically evolving system (e.g, a shared communication inter-link as the ethernet) cannot in practice be
assumed determenistic and varies from an instance to the other. To accommodate this variation, a back-
ground task was implemented to dynamically calculate the round-trip time (rtt) of inter-node messages
with relation to the current network traffic. Each new round-trip sample (Srtt) is filtered into a “smoothed”
estimate according to the formula:
(Equation 1)
where  is the current estimate of round-trip time,  is the new computed value, and α is a
constant between 0 and 1 that controls how rapidly the estimated rtt adapts to the change in network load
and is chosen to make the estimation more responsive to upward-going trends in delay and less responsive
to downward-going trends. The calculation of the optimum value of α is beyond the scope of this paper.
3.2 Detecting Application-Process Failures
Transient hardware failures can cause the failure of the application processes. Most of these errors are
detected by mechanisms built in the system hardware and the operating system kernel. These mechanisms
include traps for illegal instructions, bus errors, segmentation faults, interrupts, arithmetic exceptions, etc.
Upon the detection of errors, the OS kernel kills the affected process with a signal number that corresponds
to the error type. When a user-process exits, FADI analyses the process exit status to determine whether it
exited normally or prematurely due to a failure, in which case the failed process recovery is initiated.
With regard to the user-assisted error detection, a special signal handler was dedicated to service the detec-
tion of such errors [5]. All the programmer has to do is to raise an interrupt with a predefined signal
RTTi 1+ α RTTi 1 α–( ) Srtt×+×=
RTTi RTTi 1+
5number and the detection mechanism will handle the error as if it was raised by the kernel (OS) detection
mechanism (KDM).
For a centralised detection mechanism - such as FADI’s, it is vital to consider the latency of detecting
errors on the distributed system nodes. In addition to the time necessary for delivering the fault report to
the central detection server (approximately half the network round-trip time), we also need to consider the
reaction time of the OS kernel to transient hardware faults. The latter is calculated once by a worm-whole
type task that simulates a transient fault to measure the OS kernel reaction time. Round trip time is calcu-
lated dynamically as explained in the previous section. Hence, we can calculate the error latency of detect-
ing process failures with 99% confidence by the formula:
(Equation 2)
where:
E(Tedm) - average reaction time of the kernel error detection mechanism;
σ(Tedm) - variance of the Tedm;
rtt - current estimate round-trip time from the master node to active_nodes.
The next section discusses how to recover the distributed user application processes from processor and
network fault.
4. Recovery of Distributed Application Processes
Fault-tolerance methods for distributed systems have developed in two streams: checkpointing/rollback
recovery and process-replication mechanisms. Process replication techniques have been widely studied by
many researchers [6] [7]. With such techniques, each process is replicated and executed on a different
computer such that the probability that all replicas would fail is acceptably small. Although these tech-
niques incur a smaller degradation in performance when compared to checkpointing mechanisms, they are
not overhead-free. The failure-free overhead is caused by using multicasting mechanisms to deliver every
outgoing message to the troupe of replicated destination processes [8]. However, the main hindrance of
wide adoption of process-replication methods in various areas is the heavy cost of the redundant hardware
needed for the execution of the replicas.
In contrast with process replication mechanisms, this method does not require the duplication of the under-
lying hardware or the replication of the application processes. Instead, each process periodically records its
current state and/or some history of the system in stable storage, an action called checkpointing. If a failure
tlatency E tedm( ) 3 σ tedm( )
rtt
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6occurs, processes return to the previous checkpoint (rollback) and resume their execution from this check-
point. The overhead that this technique incurs is greater than that of process replication mechanisms
because checkpoints are taken during failure-free operation, and rollback-recovery requires certain actions
to be taken to ensure consistent recovery when processes crash. Nevertheless, this overhead is getting
smaller as the computers and communication networks become more efficient. Hence, the degradation in
performance caused by the checkpointing mechanism is quite acceptable for the class of applications FADI
is targeting.
We will discuss FADI backup and recovery technique in two stages: The first looks into the process of sav-
ing the execution state into stable storage and restoring it in case of failure. The second investigates the
coordination of the checkpointing and rollback in a distributed environment taking into account possible
inter-process communication.
4.1 FADI Non-Blocking Checkpointing Mechanism
FADI checkpointing mechanism is based on a technique developed by Condor known as Bytestream
checkpointing [9]. The idea is that the checkpointed application process should write its state information
directly into a file descriptor, and a restarting process should read that information directly from a file
descriptor.
For the targeted long-running class of applications, reducing the failure free overhead is of essential impor-
tance. Checkpointing contributes to this overhead by suspending the execution of the application program
while the checkpoint is taken and written out to disk. In an attempt to minimize the checkpointing over-
head, a non-blocking checkpointing technique was introduced. A copy is made of the program’s data space
and an asynchronous thread of control is used to perform the checkpointing routines, i.e reads the process
state and records it to disk, while the user process continues the execution of the program code.
Figure 2 gives a high-level view of FADI checkpointing and rollback mechanism. Upon normal run (start)
of the user program, FADI checkpointing prologue (linked with the checkpointed process) sets the local
system timer to invoke the checkpointing of the user process at regular intervals specified by the user in the
parameters, it then calls the user-main() routine.
Checkpointing starts by recording information about the process signal state (blocked, ignored, handled,
etc.) and the status of opened files (mode with which opened, offset at which positioned) into a data struc-
7ture allocated in the process heap - hence, part of the data segment. Then the entire data segment is written
to the checkpoint file at checkpoint time, and is read back into the same address space at restart time in the
event of failure.
To accomplish this, the start and end address of the data segment are needed. The start address is a constant
location that is usually platform specific and can be found as a linker directive in the man pages. The end
address is effectively the top of the heap, and can be returned by the UNIX sbrk() system call.
Preserving the stack requires saving and restoring the stack context (data structure containing the stack
pointer amongst other stack related information), and the actual data that makes up the stack itself.
To save and restore the stack context, standard “C” functions setjmp() and longjmp() are used. setjmp() is
called to save the current stack context into a buffer. If longjmp() is then called with a pointer to the saved
buffer, the stack context is restored and the execution returns back in the code to the point where the origi-
nal setjmp() was made. To save the stack data, the stack’s start and end points are required. The start of the
stack is a well known static location which is defined as a constant in the OS specification, the end of the
stack, by definition, is pointed by the stack pointer held in the saved stack context.
Restoring the stack is more difficult because the stack space is used (for local variables) while being
replaced. Directly replacing a process stack space with the space saved in the checkpoint file will irrevers-
ibly corrupt the executable image. To avoid this, the stack pointer is moved into a safe buffer reserved in
the process data area. Moving the stack pointer is accomplished with yet another call to setjmp(), manually
manipulating the stack pointer in the saved context to point to our buffer in the data area, followed by a
longjmp(). Then, the reserved space in the data area is used as a temporary stack to safely replace the proc-
ess original stack area with the one previously saved in the checkpoint file. So when moving the execution
stack pointer back to its original place, we will effectively be using the restored stack.
FADI maintains the integrity of user-files across the checkpointing/rollback process by tracking appends
and updates to user-files. This is achieved by augmenting UNIX system calls and “C” library functions
that write to user-files (e.g write, fwrite, printf, etc.) with in-house functions that add the file to a list before
calling the original routine. At checkpoint time, files in this list are checked and if the file was open for
update, then a shadow copy of the file is created, otherwise the file was open for append and a note is made
of its current size. When the checkpoint is taken, the forked thread is terminated with a user signal.
8If a hardware fault was detected and a rollback of the user program is requested, then the checkpointing
prologue calls the restore routine. It first replaces user files that were opened for update with their shadow
copies and truncates files that were opened for append to the size recorded at the most recent checkpoint.
These operations are performed only if the contents of the file were modified since the last checkpoint.
Then the data segment is replaced with the one stored in the checkpoint file. Now the restore routine has
the list of open files, signal handlers, etc. in its own data space, and restores those parts of the program
state. Next it switches the current program stack with that saved at checkpoint time and returns to the user
code at the same instruction that was interrupted when the last checkpoint was invoked. Finally, because
checkpointing was performed by a signal handler, UNIX OS restores all CPU registers to their state before
checkpointing took place.
Figure 2 Checkpointing & Rollback in FADI
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95. Coordination of Checkpointing and Rollback for Message-Passing
(interactive) Applications
Conventional distributed checkpointing/rollback methods fall into three categories: pessimistic message
logging, optimistic message logging and consistent (coordinated) checkpointing. Message logging
schemes allows the processes to take their checkpoints independent of each other, and they record all inter-
process messages in a message log. After a failure is detected, the previous checkpoint is restored and the
logged messages are replayed (in the same order) to bring the failed processes back to a consistent system
state. The disadvantage of message logging techiques is the overhead of logging all interprocess messages
to disk.
coordinated checkpointing protocols checkpoint all (or interacting) processes together to form a consistent
recovery line beyond which rollback is unnecessary. The advantage of coordinated checkpointing schemes
is that they do not cause failure-free overhead (because no logging is necessary). The main computational
cost of this approach is associated with blocking the applications while the recovery-lines are being stored.
This overhead can increase significantly with higher checkpointing frequencies.
This paper presents a novel checkpointing/rollback algorithm that combines the advantages of the message
logging techniques to take checkpoints for a single process at a time (without blocking the application),
with the benefit of coordinated checkpointing techniques which gives complete recovery lines. The result-
ing algorithm is characterised by small failure-free execution overhead. The algorithm is called Coordinat-
ing Checkpointing with Selective Message Logging.
5.1 System and Environmental Model
The basic model is that all processes cooperate to create a global consistent recovery line, beyond which
rollback is unnecessary. No determinism of the application processes is required, and messages are deliv-
ered via reliable FIFO channels.
Messages received by a node might not be delivered to the destination process until they are requested. i.e
messages might have already been received by the message passing daemon, but not yet consumed
(requested) by the destination process.
A centralised process running on a fail-safe node will coordinate the initiation and validation of check-
pointing in all the application processes to form a consistent recovery line. This Coordinating Task will
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also be responsible for maintaining the information logged to stable storage necessary for the selective
rollback of interacting processes (logged messages, communication trees, etc.).
5.2 Recovery Line Consistency
The fundamental concepts of FADI reliable distributed computing algorithm are devised from solutions to
the recovery-line consistency problem of coordinated checkpointing. The following notations will be used
throughout the rest of this section:
Pα : Process with index α;
Pset : Set of all the application’s distributed processes;
Cα : the ith checkpoint of process α;
Ri : the recovery line containing the ith checkpoint of all processes;
GSti : the ith global state interval between recovery line i, i+1.
Two execution scenarios need to be considered to ascertain the consistency of a recovery line:
Scenario 1 Messages sent in one state interval and received in a subsequent one:
Figure 3 Recovery-line Consistency (a)
In Figure 3, if an error occurs in GSt1 (e1 or e2), then processes Pa, Pb will roll back to the recovery line
R1. Hence, the receipt of m1 by Pa will be undone, but m1 will not be resent by Pb after the rollback.
The most commonly adopted approach to solve this problem was suggested by Silva in [10] and Elnozahy
in [8]. The messages are appended with the sender’s state interval sSt which is compared with the
receiver’s local (current) state interval lSt upon message receipt. If lSt > sSt, this indicates that the message
was sent from a previous state interval across the last recovery line so it is logged. Upon rollback, these
messages are replayed to maintain consistency.
However, these algorithms do not distinguish between the delivery and the consumption of the message.
Messages delivered to destination processes (on remote or local nodes) - whether using a low-level transfer
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protocol like TCP/IP or a high-end message passing interface like PVM [11] - are buffered by the transfer
protocol at the receiver’s end until they are requested by the destination process (consumed).
What follows is that the above approach compromises two aspects of the algorithm’s reliability:
• It applies only to errors occurring after message consumption (e2 in Figure 3), but does not take into
account errors occurring after the message was delivered but before its consumption (e1), in which
case the message (m1) will not be logged because the destination process (Pa) has not received it yet.
• It does not consider messages that might cross more than one recovery line (m2). All sent messages are
assumed to be delivered at most in the next state interval.
A principal prerequisite for recovery line consistency is the logging of all messages that cross it from left
to right. In order to avoid the shortcomings of the above approach, we have two realistic options to main-
tain the consistency of the recovery line:
1) indiscriminate sender-based message logging;
2) Identification of messages that crossed the recovery line, waiting for their receipt, logging them and
only then declaring that the recovery line is consistent.
The first option is quite expensive in terms of failure-free overhead, as explained in the previous section,
so we propose a solution based on the second option.
Scenario 2 Messages sent in one state interval but received in a previous one:
Figure 4 Recovery-line Consistency (b)
Figure 4 illustrates the case when the error occurs in GSt2 (e.g at e3), then process Pb will roll back to the
recovery line R2 and re-run. The sending of m3 by Pb will be repeated, but will not be matched by a corre-
sponding receive request from Pa. Possible solutions to this problem include:
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1) Freezing of all processes until each have taken a local checkpoint. This approach implies a time and
communication overhead during the failure-free operation of the application that can be computationally
expensive for long-running algorithms.
2) Identifying messages sent from a subsequent state interval using state interval labels [10]. If (lSt < sSt),
in which case the receiving process takes a checkpoint before consuming the message to preserve the algo-
rithms consistency. Obviously determinism here is not required because the sending and receiving of mes-
sage m3 will be performed within the same state interval “GSt2” and both operations (send and receive)
will be redone (if needed) upon rollback, which makes this approach the most attractive.
5.3 Coordinated Checkpointing with Selective Message Logging. An Algorithm for
Checkpointing & Rollback of Distributed Applications
The algorithm is based on conclusions drawn from discussing the system model and recovery line consist-
ency of recovery schemes based on coordinated checkpointing with selective message logging in the pre-
vious section.
5.3.1 Sending and Receiving Messages
Upon message send, the message is augmented with three pieces of information: send sequence number of
the ”α“ destination process SSNα, the sender ID, and the sender current local state interval LSt. After the
message is successfully delivered, SSNα is incremented. If this is the first message sent to that destination
since the last checkpoint, the Coordinator task is informed to update its list of communication flags C for
this pair (sender, dest) of application processes indicating that they have communicated in the current state
interval. This flag is set if any of the pair (l,m) sends a message to the other. The flags are cleared at the
start of each new global state interval.
procedure send_msg()
begin
append [SSN(dest_id) + sender_id + dest_id + sSt] to message body;
if (first message to dest since last checkpoint)
inform Coordinator task;
SSN(dest_id) ++;
end
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Upon message receipt, the SSN included in the received message is compared with the sequence number of
the latest message received from the same process (stored locally in RSN). If the previous sequence
number (RSN) is greater or equal to the newly received SSN, then a local checkpoint of the receiver state is
taken to preserve the algorithm consistency. Next the receiver process compares the received sSt with the
current local lSt, if the local state interval is bigger, then the message was sent from a previous state inter-
val crossing the recovery line LRmsg and it should be logged.
5.3.2 The Checkpointing Protocol
At regular intervals the Coordinator task sends a checkpointing request (ckpt_req) to the application proc-
esses. The ckpt_req is sent together with the global state interval GSt. Each process takes a local check-
point and sends an acknowledgment message ckpt_ack which contains local arrays of received messages
(RM) and sent messages (SM). Each RM array holds for every message originator two items of informa-
tion: the “sender_id” and the receive sequence number of the last received message “RSN”. Similarly to
the RM array, the SM array contains: “dest_id” and the send sequence number “SSN” of last message sent
to that destination.
After the Coordinator task receives ckpt_ack from the application process, it checks if all the sent mes-
sages were received by the correspondent destination processes. If that is the case, then the recovery line is
declared consistent and the global state interval is incremented.
Otherwise, information about unbalanced (unreceived) messages is added to the inconsistency (unbal-
anced messages) list “UBmsg”. In this case, no new checkpoints are requested, and the Coordinator task
inquires the processes on the receiving end of the unbalanced messages to check if the messages have been
procedure receive_msg()
begin
unpack [SSN + sender_id + dest_id + sSt & message body];
if (SSN <= RSN(sender_id)) then
take a local checkpoint;
else
RSN(sender_id) = SSN;
endif
if (sSt < lSt) then
log msg to LRmsg in stable storage;
endif
end
14
received (recv_req). When all messages in UBmsg are received, the last recovery-line is declared consist-
ent, Gst is incremented, and the normal checkpointing operation is resumed.
It is worth to note that during checkpointing, flushing the transient messages data is not necessary to com-
mit output as in traditional message logging techniques since in the case of failure the message can be
replayed from the log, or resent if the sender is forced to rollback [8]
5.3.3 The Rollback Protocol
When a process fails, the Coordinator task looks up the communication table C(l,m) and only the proc-
esses that interacted with the failed process since the last global checkpoint are rolled-back. Messages
addressed to the rolled back processes are replayed from the log.
procedure checkpoint()
begin
at periodic intervals do
begin
send ckpt_req[GSt] to all processes in Pset;
await* for ckpt_ack[SM[sn], RM[rn]] from every p(i) in Pset;
for each p(i) in Pset
for each SM(k) in SM[sn]
if not exists RM(j=1..rn) that ((RM(j).RSN == SM(k).SSN) &&
(RM(j).sender_id == SM(k).dest.id)) then
add SM(k) to UBmsg;
endif
end
end
if UBmsg is not empty then
at periodic intervals repeat
send recv_req to all SM(k).dest_id in UBmsg;
await for recv_ack [RM[rn]];
for each SM(k) in UBmsg
if exists RM(j=1..rn) that ((RM(j).RSN == SM(k).SSN) &&
(RM(j).sender_id == SM(k).dest.id)) then
remove SM(k) from UBmsg;
endif
end
Until (UBmsg is empty)
endif
Declare Recovery-line(GSt) consistent;
free logged messages from GSt-1;
Gst++;
clear communication flags C(l,m)
end
end
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6. Performance Measurements
The performance tests were carried out on a network of three workstations connected by a 10 Mbit/sec
Ethernet. The main node running the Fault-management tasks is a SPARC_20 server running SOLARIS
5.5.1 (60 MHz clock rate, 32 Mbytes of main memory, 5 Gbyte SCSI disk drives). The applications were
distributed between two diskless SPARCstation IPCs running SunOS 4.1.3 (40 MHz clock rate, 8 and 16
Mbyte of main memory).
6.1 Performance Metric Requirements
The main overheads that can affect the run-time of the distributed applications are:
a) The message logging overhead: it includes the overhead of tracking the dependencies of sent/received
messages exchanged between the application processes (i.e augmenting bookkeeping information to mes-
sages, processing this information to maintain the consistency of the communication channels, etc.), and
the overhead of logging inconsistent messages into stable storage.
b) The checkpointing overhead: it includes the overhead of taking the checkpoint (i.e saving the process
image: open-files, communication sockets state, signal handling information, process data and stack seg-
ments), and the time spent on writing the checkpoint in a disk.
Because of the long MTBF of modern computer systems, failures are considered an exception rather than a
rule, therefore the overhead of application rollback can hardly affect its execution time. However, for on-
line distributed applications (e.g flight reservation systems, industrial decision support systems), the dis-
ruption of distributed services must be within acceptable limits to the system operator. The average roll-
back time for the synthetic applications experiment was 6.5 seconds.
6.2 Benchmarking FADI using a Synthetic Application
This study evaluates FADI’s performance for managing fault-tolerance for message-passing applications.
Therefore, a test application was designed which is communication-intensive and with small computation
cycles, so that the measured overhead will mainly be due to interprocess communication. Four processes
procedure rollback(fail_processID)
begin
look up processes in C(fail_processID, *)
for all * processes
rollback to Gst
unset C(fail_processID, *)
replay all messages to * from LRmsg
end
rollback fail_process
replay messages from LRmsg to fail_process
end
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were distributed amongst two SPARCstation IPCs. The first generates random numeric data, passes it to
the second, where it is hashed by a simple arithmetic operation, and the same is repeated by the third proc-
ess. The fourth process holds the hash keys for the second and third processs. It decodes the received data
package and sends it back to the first process where it is checked against the original values to verify that
the data integrity was maintained throughout the pipeline.
6.2.1 Experimental Results
Figure 5 shows the affect of varying the rate of messages exchanged between the application processes on
the failure-free overhead of the application. Incrementing the message rate mainly affects the time spent on
augmenting each message with bookkeeping information (12 bytes containing: State interval, sender ID,
send sequence number), and tracking the dependencies of the exchanged messages, i.e keeping records of
the last sent and received message for every application. This overhead is persistent as long as there are
messages sent/received between the application processes, while the message logging overhead affects the
execution of the application only if a message crosses the recovery line due to our selective message log-
ging policy. Subsequently the failure-free overhead gradually grows, but even with a considerable message
exchange rate (6.4 Kbyte/sec) the overhead was measured at 2.9% which comfortably falls within the
widely acceptable “10%” overhead on application execution time [14].
Sens in [13] implemented an independent checkpointing scheme with pessimistic message logging, and for
a much less communication-demanding application (0.06 Kbyte/sec) the overhead was 3.0% with a similar
checkpointing interval of 2min.
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From Figure 5 it can also be noticed that changing the size of the application processes while varying the
message rate has little affect on the failure-free overhead, the curves for various heap sizes of the application
process almost overlap.
Figure 6 (a) illustrates the checkpointing overhead of the application for three image sizes versus the fre-
quency of taking the checkpoints. For the three variations of the application the overhead increases as the
checkpointing interval is reduced, the reason being that with smaller intervals (higher checkpointing fre-
quencies), more checkpoints are taken. When employing the non-blocking checkpointing policy, the check-
pointing procedures are virtually performed by a forked thread while the main program concurrently
continues execution. However, some execution time is still lost when the OS kernel makes the context switch
and swaps one of the processes out. This slight increase in the overhead is escalated with large image sizes
(more Kbytes to write to disk) and hence the deviation in the overhead of the three curves in Figure 6 (a) as
the checkpointing interval decreases.
Figure 6 Failure-Free Overhead as Function of the Checkpoint Interval
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coordinated checkpointing algorithm [8] scored less overhead for higher checkpointing frequencies (1.8%
for 2min interval), but our algorithm performs better as the checkpointing frequency decreases(0.2% over-
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KB applications size and 10 min. checkpointing interval) the overhead of sequential checkpointing was
5.72% as opposed to 0.12% for non-blocking checkpointing.
This performance study indicates that FADI’s reliable distributed computing protocol exhibited low over-
head even with overestimated message exchange rates, which proves the system feasibility for communi-
cation-intensive distributed applications. However, larger overheads (although still acceptable) were
measured for shorter checkpointing intervals. Because of the transparency of the implementation of our
reliable distributed computing algorithm, the checkpointing frequency can be tuned without any modifica-
tion to the application code. The requirements of FADI targeted applications (extended execution time)
allow for higher checkpointing frequencies and will therefore bear low overhead when run under FADI.
We conjecture that these results will hold on modern hardware platforms as well. Fast Ethernet networks
can deliver communication rate up to a Gigabit per second and the latest Sun SPARCstation “ULTRA 80”
clocks 450 MHz and can accomodate 4GB of RAM.
7. Status and Conclusions
FADI was designed to provide a fault-tolerant distributed environment that provides distributed system
users and parallel programmers with an integrated processing environment, where they can reliably exe-
cute their concurrent (distributed) applications despite errors that might occur in the underlying hardware.
This integrated environment encompasses all aspects of modern fault-tolerant distributed computing: auto-
matic remote process allocation, detection of hardware errors, and a technique to recover distributed user
processes running under FADI from these errors.
FADI user-transparent error detection mechanism covers processor node crashes and hardware transient
failures, and allows for the integration of user-programmed error checks into the detectable errors data-
base. A limitation of the algorithm is that it assumes that the processing nodes are fail-silent, i.e they
deliver correct output or none at all. Therefore, certain faults in the communication link (e.g messages
delivered with erroneous content or network partitioning) are not considered. However, duplicate message
are tolerated.
A non-blocking checkpointing policy was adopted to backup and restore the state of the application proc-
esses. The checkpointing mechanism forks an exact copy (thread) of the application program, this thread
performs all the checkpointing routines without suspending the execution of the application code, thus sig-
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nificantly reducing the checkpointing overhead. In addition, the checkpointing mechanism comprises a
model for restoring the user-files in case of failure. It uses a combination of copy-shadowing and file size
bookkeeping to undo modifications to user-files upon rollbacks.
In order to coordinate the operation of the checkpointing mechanism in distributed computing environ-
ments, a novel approach to reliable distributed computing for messages-passing applications was devised.
It takes advantage of the low failure-free overhead of coordinated checkpointing methods with logging
messages that cross the recovery line to avoid blocking the application process during the checkpointing
protocol. The low failure-free overhead is at the expense of a longer rollback time which is admissible
because of the extended execution time of the targeted application. In contrast with similar algorithms, this
technique is tolerant to errors occurring whilst messages are in transit, i.e messages are delivered to the
destination (queued at message passing daemon or transport protocol thread), but not yet requested (con-
sumed) by the receiving process. The algorithm requires only one global checkpoint to be recorded in sta-
ble storage and avoids multiple rollbacks (domino effect).
The experimental results gained by exhaustive testing of the FADI environment with synthetic applications
showed that the system compares favourably with similar fault tolerant environments and exhibits low-
overhead even with an over-estimated message exchange rate.
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Figure 2 Checkpointing & Rollback in FADI
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Figure 3 Recovery-line Consistency (a)
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Figure 4 Recovery-line Consistency (b)
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Figure 5 Failure-Free Overhead as a Function of Message Exchange Frequency
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Figure 6  Failure-Free Overhead as Function of the Checkpoint Interval
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